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ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this study is to document rela-
tionships between two weapon system program outcomes, cost
and schedule growth, and aspects of the political and
economic climate during system development. The data sample
selected for study was aerospace industry-related weapon
system programs. The central methodology used in the analy-
sis included:
1. The identification of factors reflecting the economic
and political conditions expected to be associated
with program outcomes.
2. The creation of measures of cost and schedule growth.
3. Statistical analysis was conducted to test the
hypothesized relationships between program outcomes
and explanatory factors.
The analysis was conducted to separately explain three
program outcomes: development cost growth, development
schedule growth, and total program cost growth.
General conclusions from this study are that sigrificant
relationships do exist between cost and schedule growth and
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The Department of Defense is charged with the broad
requirement of ensuring the national security. We live,
however, in a period of great insecurity. As the recent
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq serves to illustrate, the change
in the roles of the world's superpowers has done nothing to
reduce the need for a sophisticated, flexible military
capability.
Yet, such a capability has proven to be incredibly
expensive, in terms of both national resources and time. At
the same time, the amount of resources available to the
Department of Defense have been reduced, and may be expected
to continue to decline for the foreseeable future.
p
It is this environment that today's--and the future's--
program managers, budgeters, and policy makers must work
within as they grapple with the means to reduce the cost and
time required to procure the Department of Defense's "tools
of the trade": weapon systems.
This study will look at cost and schedule growth for a
representative sample of weapons from the aerospace
industry. Some non-technical but potentially important
factors that may influence cost and schedule growth will be
introduced, and the nature of their relationships with cost
1
and schedule growth will be hypothesized and examined.
Specifically, this study will examine the relationships of
cost and schedule growth with selected economic, polltical/
budgetary, and weapon system program-related factors.
There have been several related studies done. One such
study, by K.W. Tyson, J.R. Nelson, N.I. Om, and P.R. Palmer,
Acquisition of Major Systems: Cost and Schedule Trends and
Acquisition Initiative Effectivenesi [Ref. 1], provides the
background for this study. In their study, Tyson, at al.,
created a sample containing cost and schedule growth data
for a large set of weapon systems produced since the 1960's,
and provided measures of program outcomes vis-a-vis cost and
schedule growth. A central purpose of the Tyson, et al.,
study was to provide a d of program outcomes.
Associations between program outcomes and certain
contracting initiatives were also examined.
This study goes beyond the description of program
outcomes, to eplanIjQi: why was cost and/or schedule
growth relatively high or low on some programs when compared
with others? What factors seem to explain or influence this
growth? These are some of the questions this study attempts
to answer.
In the remainder of this chapter, the objectives of this
study are developed. The methodology is then described,
followed by a summary of the study's findings. Finally, an
2
outline of the contents of the following chapters is
provided.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to document relationships
between weapon system acquisition program outcomes, and
aspects of the political and economic climate during the
period of system development. It will also address whether
these relationships are systematic, predictable, and
significant. The desired benefit of this analysis is to
create at least a preliminary understanding of the nature of
these relationships.
C. METHODOLOGY
To achieve this objective, the following methodology was
adopted:
- Relevant literature discussing factors that influence
cost and schedule performance during weapon cystem
procurement was reviewed;
- Factors reflecting the economic and political
conditions that are expected to be associated with
program outcomes were identified;
- The nature of the expected relationships were specified
as hypotheses;
- Operational measures of cost growth and schedule growth
were created. The Tyson data base and procedures were
used in this step;
- Data were collected and measures created to operation-
alize the relevant economic/political factors;
- Statistical analysis was conducted to test the
hypothesized relationships between program outcomes and
3
explanatory factors. The analysis was conducted to
separately explain three program outcomes:
* development cost growth,
* development schedule growth,
* total program cost growth;
Conclusions concerning the significance and importance
of economic/political factors in explaining program
outcomes were provided.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This study was able to document that some significant
relationships do exist between program outcomes and economin
and political explanatory factors. Primarily, two
preliminary conclusions were reached. First, cost growth is
more sensitive to the explanatory factors than schedule
growth. This is reasonable in that weapon system program
control is exercised through budgetary means. Second,
Congressional Majority Party has a significant impact on
cost and schedule growth. Specifically, cost and schedule
growth is greater for programs initiated when there is a
relatively stronger democratic majority in Congress.
E. THESIS OUTLINE
In Chapter II the explanatory factors are discussed, and
hypotheses presented. The results of a literature review
attempting to identify possible explanatory factors is
recounted. Eight explanatory factors are identified and
separated into three broad categories: Economic Factors,
4
Political/Budgetary Factors, and Program Related Factors. A
scenario explaining how each of these factors might
logically impact program cost and/or schedule growth is
developed, followed by a statement of specific hypotheses.
Chapter III presents the sample constructed by Tyson, et
al., the methods used to measure the explanatory factors
identified in Chapter II (the independent variables), and
the procedures used to construct the measures for the
program outcomes (the dependent variables).
In Chapter IV, the results of the analysis testing the
hypotheses are presented. The tests used to conduct the
analysis are described, and the findings tabulated and
discussed.
In Chapter V, the work described in Chapters II, III,
and IV is summarized, and conclusions are drawn from the
results of analysis. Limitations and constraints on the
conduct of the study are then discussed, followed by some
recommendations for further research.
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II. DISU __I NOF EXPLANATORY FACTORS
AND VTATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES
As stated in Chapter I, the objective of this study is
to identify factors that could be expected to influence
program outcomes (cost and schedule growth) and to test for
A'ssociations between program outcomes and these factors.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss the
explanatory factors that will later be investigated
empirically in the study.
The approach used to identify potential factors of
interest was to review related literature that investigated
similar problems. Two studies were particularly helpful in
this respect. Tyson, et. al. [Ref. 1] explicitly studied
cost and schedule growth of weapon system programs. In fact
the measures of cost and schedule outcomes used in the
current analysis are from the earlier Tyson et. al., study.
The current study will examine some cost/schedule growth
factors suggested and previously tested by Tyson et al.
Moses [Ref. 4] also explicitly investigated cost over and
underruns. A list of explanatory factors offered by Moses
was relied upon to identify factors relevant to the current
analysis. Two other works also proved helpful; White and
Hendrix [Ref. 3] and Moses [Ref. 2]. White and Hendrix
reviewed the broad process of defense acquisitions and, at
points, suggested possible factors that may influence
6
cost/schedule outcomes. Moses conducted a study of
contractor pricing strategies, and in so doing suggested
factors that may influence costs paid during acquisition.
There are many reasons for cost/schedule growth
suggested in the literature. The factors investigated in
this study represent only a subset, and the list does not
pretend to be exhaustive. Four criteria were considered in
selecting factors for analysis: 1) The factor was suggested
in the literature as having a potential impact on cost or
schedule performance during the acquisition of weapon
systems; 2) The manner in which a factor would be expected
to influence cost/schedule outcomes could be stated, i.e.,
an unambiguous hypothesis could be developed; 3) Procedures
for creating reasonable measures of the factors could be
envisioned; 4) Data were available to create the measures.
The factors to be addressed empirically in the study
fall into three broad categories. The category boundaries
are somewhat fuzzy, but the category labels provide some
general indication of the kinds of factors identified in the
literature review.
- Economic Factors;
* Economy Wide Conditions,








* Program Type (New versus Modified),
* Program Stretch Out.
Consider the concept of cost (or schedule) growth: Any
indicator of cost growth involves a comparison of two
measures of cost, an initial estimate and an after-the-fact
actual cost. "Cost growth" may result from one or both of
two mechanisms. First, the initial estimate may be too
")ow." Thus even if actual cost incurrance is "normal,"
cost growth will appear to occur. Second, the initial
estimate may be "fair." But actual cost performance may be
inefficient. Again, cost growth will be apparent.
The current study focuses on the first of these two
mechanisms. Attention will be directed toward factors that
may cause initial estimates of cost or schedule to be biased
(downward). Thus in general, each of the above factors is
an attempt to reflect some aspect of the economic,
political, or budgetary environment existing at the
initiation of a weapon system program (or some aspect of the
program itself) which is anticipated to have an effect on
initial estimates of cost and/or schedules. Thus each
factor is expected to provide some opportunity, some
incentive, or some constraint which could lead to an impact
on program cost or schedule.
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The remainder of the chapter discusses each factor
individually. For each factor, the discussion covers the
following: a) a description of the factor; b) an argument
supporting the hypothesis that the factor may be associated
with cost and/or schedule outcomes (this usually takes the
form of a story or scenario by which the factor leads to
government or contractor actions that impact costs or
schedule); c) an indication of the results of relevant
prior research; d) an indication, when necessary, of how
the factor will be operationalized (measured) empirically;
and e) an explicit statement of the hypothesis stating the




This factor may be described simply as the state of
the U.S. economy, i.e., growth, stagnation, or contraction.
If economic conditions are poor (stagnant or
contracting) during the period in which initial planning and
negotiations for a project occur, demand from the commercial
product market may be correspondingly reduced. Capital
intensive firms may desire additional work to keep their
equipment and personnel occupied. This may cause these
firms to look for additional work in defense contracts,
which may be in relatively large supply compared to the
9
demand for commercial products. If many firms pursue
government defense work in this way, there may be sufficient
competition among them to cause a reduction in price and/or
schedule estimates, as firms will reduce these estimates in
their offers in an attempt to improve their chances of
obtaining the contract(s). These estimates may leave
insufficient slack to deal with future contingencies without
increasing costs and/or schedule delays.
- HI: Poor economic conditions at the time of program
initiation are expected to be associated with
subsequent cost and/or schedule growth.
The rate of growth (or contraction) in the Gross
National Product (GNP) will be used to measure the economy's
condition.
2. Industry Capacity Utilization
This factor refers to what amount of manufacturing
capacity of the defense industry is in use at a given point
in time.
The amount of excess capacity the industry possesses
will determine how much additional work the industry can
accommodate. If industry wide capacity utilization in the
period prior to contract award is low, firms desiring new or
additi.onal defense contracts will be in competition with
other firms in the defense industry, and will be likely to
respond to the competition by lowering their bid price in
order to obtain a contract. In the process of reducing
10
prices to win contracts, they may underestimate the true
cost and schedule requirements, and cost or schedule
overruns may be experienced as a result.
Greer and Liao [Ref. 5] found that when industry
capacity is low, defense firms in the aerospace industry are
more likely to lower their prices to attain defense
contracts. Also, the inverse was found to be true: when
capacity utilization is high, firms are essentially "too
busy" to bid aggressively for defense work, and prices stay
higher.
- H2: Low industry capacity utilization at the time of
program initiation is expected to be associated with
subsequent cost and schedule growth.
B. POLITICAL/BUDGETARY FACTORS
1. Defense Spending
The level of defense spending surrounding the period
of contract award may influence cost and schedule outcomes.
Consider the level of defense spending immediately prior to
contract award, when estimates of program costs are being
made. If spending on defense has been relatively tight in
the period leading up to contract award, contractors may
perceive the need to bid low to obtain a contract, due to
apparent constraints on the government's willingness to
support defense spending. DoD cost estimators and
negotiators may "accept" low estimates, to get a program
started. Thus cost and schedule estimates may understate
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the actual higher level of costs and time required to
successfully complete the contract. This would cause
increased cost and/or schedule growth through the life of
the program.
- H3: Low levels of defense spending at the time of
program initiation is expected to be associated with
subsequent cost and/or schedule growth.
2. Acauisition Environment
The defense acquisition process has been in a state
of almost continual evolution since World War II, with a
rapid increase in the rate of change beginning in the early
1960's. For purposes of this study, the acquisition
environment refers to the volume of legislative regulation
related to the process.
Over the years, Congress has enacted successive
pieces of legislation in the hope of reducing defense
program acquisition costs and controlling defense contractor
performance. Few if any laws applicable to this process
have been repealed. If this process has had the desired
effect, we would expect to see defense contractor
performance with respect to cost and schedule outcomes
improve over time. That is, new and better regulations
controlling contractor behavior and the government's role in
the acquisition process may directly lead to reductions in
cost and schedule growth.
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It is possible, however, that these successive
reforms may have had an effect other than that desired. The
increases in the legislation and regulations designed to
improve the overall process may have in fact substantially
increased the cost of compliance for contractors. Costs and
schedules could be expected to grow with the increased
scrutiny and paperwork contractors must endure and create as
they struggle to comply.
The volume of acquisition regulation is directly
related to the passage of time. The later a program was
started, the more regulations that exist pertaining to it,
and the less effectively it may be managed. It may
consequently cost more and take longer to produce.
- H4: Programs initiated more recently are expected to
be associated with higher cost and schedule growth.
3. Presidential Party
This factor simply refers to the political party of
the President of the United States at the time of program
initiation. The president of the United States is in a
powerful position of leadership, thereby deriving a
significant level of legislative influence. A cursory look
at the ] st 40 years or so would provide grounds to argue
that presidents have used this influence to affect the
government's position regarding defense policy in general,
and towards the defense industry in particular.
13
The Republican party has traditionally been
perceived as the advocate of big business and defense
interests. It is possible that Republican presidents have
used their influence to pursue defense spending as well as
to promote other "pro defense" policies. If the traditional
view of Republicans is correct, Republican administrations
can be expected to take actions which will facilitate the
initiation of defens 1 ograms. A downward biasing of
initial cost/schedule batimates, or the willingness to
accept uncritically such favorable estimates, would have
this effect. Thus, we would expect to see higher cost and
schedule growth in programs initiated when there is a
Republican rather than a Democrat in the White House.
- H,: Programs initiated under a Republican presidential
administration are expected to be associated with
subsequent cost and/or schedule growth.
4. congressional Maloritv Party
This factor describes the situation of political
party control in the legislative brancL of the United States
government, specifically the House and Senate of the
Congress.
The majority party in Congress as a whole should be
able to exercise controlling influence with regard to
defense spending. In addition to possessing the larger
voting block, organizational rules within the Congress
stipulate that all standing committee chairpersons be
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members of the majority party. Thus, the majority should be
able to defend a same-party president's budgetary desires,
and undermine or counter those of the other party's
president. Given incentives analogous to those discussed
above in the case of the president's political party, we
might expect to see greater cost and schedule growth for
programs initiated when Republicans hold a relatively larger
representation in Congress.
- HE: Programs initiated when Republicans have
relatively stronger representation in Congress are
expected to be associated with subsequent cost and/or
schedule growth.
C. PROGRAM-RELATED FACTORS
1. Program Type (New versus Modified)
"New" programs are those that are the first to
possess their given designation, e.g., AV-SA. Modified
systems are those that are improvements to the original
"new" system, e.g., AV-8B.
New systems are initiated in response to a change in
the perceived threat that cannot be met through an existing
system. Thus, they are usually designed "from scratch" and
require significant research and development, and frequent
fine tuning during actual production. In contrast, modified
systems are generally incremental changes that leave the
majority of the original, proven system unchanged, and thus
benefit greatly from not having to start completely over.
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Testing requirements should be shorter, and cost and
schedule requirements should be easier to predict and
control.
- H7: New programs are expected to be associated with
greater subsequent cost and schedule growth.
Tyson, et al., found that the expected relationship
between lower cost and schedule growth and modification
programs hold, except in the cases of electronic warfare
aircraft and air-launched tactical munitions.
2. Program Stretc._Q
Program stretch out refers to the condition whereby
the government alters plans to procure a set number of a
system by obtaining fewer each year, but for more years.
The service...starts off assuming that a certain number of
dollars will be available with which to procure certain
quantities of various weapon systems. Then, typically,
the Total Obligational Authority is reduced--often by the
president first, then by Congress. The proper way to
handle such a budget cut, in order to maintain the
efficiency of the remaining programs, would be to assign
priorities and then to defer or cancel enough lower
priority programs that the cuts could be absorbed.
Historically, both the DoD and Congress have been
reluctant to cancel programs; the approach has been simply
to buy fewer units of each system "this year" and to
stretch out all the programs, hoping to purchase the rest
of the units in later years. [Ref. 6:pp. 122-123]
In this way, we see the decision to stretch out
programs will by definition increase their ichedule growth.
And, as fewer units are produced each year, their per unit
costs should also grow. Fewer units are purchased at
greater cost over a longer than planned period of time.
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- He: Program Stretch Out is expected to be associated
with cost and schedule growth.
Tyson, et al. [Ref. 1] investigated the role of
program stretch out in cost and schedule growth. Their
research clearly demonstrated the relationship between the
deliberate lengthening of a program in the development and
production phases with cost and schedule growth.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the explanatory factors to be
investigated were identified and discussed. Through a
review of the literature, eight separate factors were
identified. An explanation of how these factors may impact
cost and/or schedule growth was developed, and the
hypotheses that will later be tested were presented.
In Chapter III, the context in which the hypotheses are
to be tested will be discussed. Specifically, Chapter III
describes the sample of programs to be studied, the methods
for operationalizing each of the explanatory factors, and
the methods for measuring the dependant variables.
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III. SAMPLE/DATA/MEASURES
This chapter describes the sample to be used for the
analysis, the methods used to operationalize the explanatory
factors presented in Chapter II as independent variables,
and the procedures used to construct the outcome measures,
i.e., the dependent variables reflecting cost and schedule
growth. In presenting the sample, the data gathering
process used by Tyson, et al. [Ref. 1] will be briefly
described. The entire data base is included in the
Appendix.
The measures of cost and schedule growth were taken from
Tyson, et al.'s previous analysis of the 89 systems in the
sample. These cost and schedule growth measures are the
dependent variables for this study.
In operationalizing the explanatory factors from Chapter
II, the method of measurement will be presented and
discussed, along with an argument, where necessary, of how
the measure captures the essence of the explanatory factor.
A. THE ACQUISITION PROGRAM SAMPLE
The sample used in the current study was originally
compiled by Tyson, et al. [Ref. 1]. In the Tyson study, 89
separate weapon system acquisition programs, listed in
18
Table 111-1, were investigated. The 89 systems fell within





- Air-Launched Tactical Munitions;




Chronologically, the sample spans a 32 year period, from
1958 to 1985, and includes Army, Navy (including Marine
corps), and Air Force programs. The primary source of cost
and schedule information were Selected Acquisition Reports
(SAR). Other sources were the Defense Market Service
"Missiles Market Intelligence Reports" and Jane's Weapon
SysteMs 1987-88. The sample includes both programs that
were considered to be successful as well as some that were
considered to have had encountered problems, in development
and/or production. Nearly all programs in the sample are
either still in production and in service, or are previous






Tactical Electronic Other Tactical
Aircraft Aircraft Helicopter Aircraft Munitions
F-14A E-3A UH-60A C-5A AIM-7E*
F-14D* E-4 AH-64A C-5B* AIM-7F*
F-15 EF-IlA* DH-58D* FB-I1IA* AIM-7M*
F-16 S-3A CH-47D* V-22 AIM-9L*
F/A-18 E-2C* Cheyenne C-17A AIM-9M*
A-10 E-6A LAMPS MK III B-IA AIM-54A
F-5E* EA-6B* B-1B* AIM-54C*











Munitions Avionics Missiles Satellites
MLRS ASPJ ALCM DMSP
CLGP JSTARS Tomahawk* NAVSTAR GPS
5 Inch GP JTIDS Trident II* DSP
STD Missile 2* LANTIRN GLCM* DSCS III
Patriot MLS Small Missle
(ICBM)
Pershing 11* OTH-B Minuteman II*
Lance TRI-TAC Minuteman III*
Roland* WIS Peacekeeper
Sgt York ADDS SRAM









* Denotes modified vice new programs.
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B. PROGRAM OUTCOMES/DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In this section, the methods for constructing the three
dependent variables will be described.
These variables were constructed by Tyson, et al., as
outcome measures in their study. Tyson, et al., found that
there were significantly different drivers for cost and
schedule growth in the development phase of a program's life
when compared to the production phase. Thus, separate
measures of cost and schedule growth for both development
and production phases were created, so that each could be
evaluated independently. Total cost growth was also
included to provide an overall measure of cost growth for
each program.
The current study will address the following three
outcome measures as dependent variables:
- Development Cost Growth;
- Development Schedule Growth;
- Total Program Cost Growth.
Each variable is measured as a ratio of an initial
estimate (of cost or schedule) with an actual outcome (or a
most recently updated "current" estimate). See Table 111-2
for summaries of the program outcomes, and the labels that
will be used for them in later chapters of this study.
1. Dvelo mert Cost GrowH
The measure of development cost growth was




Dependant Variables Concept Label
Development Cost Growth Ratio of the DCG
estimate of Total
Cost at IOC Date to
Initial SAR Development
Cost Estimate
Development vchedule Ratio of Actual DSG








cost as of the initial operational capability (IOC) date by
the initial development cost estimate provided in the
initial SAR for the program. Thus,
DCu - Development Cost as of IOC Date
Initial SAR Development Cost Estimate
Development costs incurred after IOC were not
included, as these were for major system modifications, and
considered beyond the scope of the original development
effort [Ref. l:p. 111-7].
2. Development Schedule Growth
Tyson, et al., measured schedule growth during
development by measuring the time between full scale
development commencement and its completion. The
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development schedule growth (DSG) ratio was then computed
using the following formula:
DSG Actual Time (Months) From FSD to IOC
Estimated Time (Months) From FSD to IOC
3. Total Program Cost Growth
Estimates ef total program costs (TPC) were
determined by adding the estimate of development costs from
th6 SAR at the initial operational capability (IOC) date to
the production cost estimate (CE) for the quantity
originally ordered (called the development estimate
quantity, or DEQ):
- Develo~ment Costs Estimate @ IOC + Qfo Q
Total Program Cost (TPC)
The total program cost growth (TPCG) ratio was then
derived by dividing total program cost by the estimate of
total program cost, determined at Milestone II (just prior
to the initiation of full scale development).
TPCG = Total Program Cost (TPC)
Total Cost Estimate, Milestone II
C. EXPLANATORY FACTORS/INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In this section, the methods for measuring each of the
factors identified in Chapter II will be presented. Where
necessary, justification for the method used will be
provided.
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The factors included in this study require data measured
at the beginning of the program. Tyson, et al., defined the
program's beginning as the approval date for full scale
development. Data measured at a program's beginning are
taken for the year in which full scale development began.
Full scale development dates are provided in Tyson, et al.'s
work'. See Table 111-3 for a summary of the explanatory
factor variables, their labels and hypothesized relation-
ships. The Appendix provides a complete list of the




Indenendent Variables Concept Label RelationshiD
Economy Wide Change in ECON (-)
Conditions GNP for Year
Prior to FSD









'Labeled "ACQ ENV" in the Appendix of this study.
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1. Economic Factors
a. Economy Wide Conditions
Hypothesis One requires a measure of growth (or
decline) in the Gross National Product (GNP). For each
program, the change in the growth in GNP for the year prior
to the year of program full scale development initiation was
calculated. This reflects the trend in the economy at the
time full scale development was initiated. The figures for
GNP are in constant 1982 dollars.
- ECON: Change in GNP for the year prior to FSD.
GNP data for each program's FSD year were taken
from H.W. Stanley and R.G. Niemi [Ref. 9:pp. 346-347].
b. Industry Capacity Utilization
Hypothesis Two requires a measure of an
industry-specific economic condition, industry capacity
utilization. For each program, two measures were
constructed: a measure of the percentage of industry
capacity utilization at the time of program initiation
(i.e., FSD), and a measure of the change in industry
capacity utilization during the year immediately prior to
FSD. The first measure reflects the degree of capacity
utilization; the second measure reflects the recent trend.
- CAPUTIL: Industry capacity utilization at FSD date.
- D-CAPUTIL: Change in industry capacity utilization for
the year prior to program FSD.
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Data to measure these variables were taken from
Greer and Liao [Ref. 5]. For all programs, aerospace
industry capacity utilization was used. This is argued to
be acceptable because each program in the sample either
flies, fires an aerodynamic projectile, is a space system,
or a communication system for one of the above2 .
2. Political/Budgetary Factor.
a. Defense Spending
Hypothesis Three requires a measure of the
defense spending level for the year each program began full
scale development. For each program, two measures were
constructed: a measure of total defense outlays at the time
of program initiation (FSD), and a measure of the change in
defense spending during the year immediately prior to FSD.
The first measure reflects the impact of defense spending,
the second measure reflects the recent trend.
- DEFSPND: Outlays for defense for the year of program
FSD start.
- D-DEFSPND: Change in outlays for defense for the
year prior to program FSD.
The level of defense spending for the year prior
to the program's beginning was found in the OMB Historical
2The exceptions within this list are the three
torpedoes (MK-48, MK-48 ADCAP, and MK-50). Their producers,
Honeywell, Gould, and Hughes, are sufficiently involved in
aerospace-related programs to warrant their inclusion in
this list.
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Tables of the Budget of the United States Government [Ref.
7]. All amounts are in billions of constant 1982 dollars.
b. Acquisition Environment
Hypothesis Four requires some measure of the
effect of the passage of time and the consequential addition
of new acquisition legislation. One measure for each
program was constructed, consisting of the last two digits
of the year each program entered FSD. This measure reflects
the impact of the acquisition environment, based on the
point in time at which programs were exposed to it.
- ACQ ENV: Year program entered FSD.
These variables were taken from Appendix A of
Tyson et al.'s study [Ref. 1].
c. Presidential Party
Hypothesis Five requires a measure of major
political party (Republican or Democrat only) occupation of
the Presidency at the time each program began FSD. For each
program, one measure was constructed. A "0" was assigned if
the president at FSD start year was a Democrat, and a "I"
assigned if a Republican.
The measure will thus quantitatively reflect the
presidential political party at the beginning of FSD for
each program.
- PRES PARTY: Presence of a Democrat or Rapublican in
the office of President of the United States at program
FSD start.
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Data for these measures were taken from H.W.
Stanley and R.G. Niemi [Ref. 9].
d. Congressional Majority Party
Hypothesis Six requires a measure of the
relative degree of political power between parties in the
U.S. Congress. For each program, six separate measures were
constructed. The first three measure the ratio of Democrats
to Republicans in the House, the Senate, and combined (i.e.,
the Combined Houses of Congress). That is, the total number
of Democrats divided by the total number of Republicans in
the House, Senate, and Combined Houses for the year of
program FSD start. The second three measure the change in
the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the House, Senate,
and combined, for the year prior to program FSD. The first
three measures reflect the party majority; the second three
measures reflect the recent trend in that majority.
- HSE RATIO: The ratio of Democrats to Republicans in
the House of Representatives at program FSD start.
- SEN RATIO: The ratio of Democrats to Republicans in
the Senate at program FSD start.
- CONG RATIO: The ratio of Democrats to Republicans in
the Combined Houses at program FSD start.
- D-HSE RATIO: The change in the ratio of Democrats to
Republicans in the House of Representatives for the
year prior to program FSD start.
- D-SEN RATIO: The change in the ratio of Democrats to
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- D-CONG RATIO: The change in the ratio of Democrats to
Republicans in the Combined Houses for the year prior
to program FSD start.
Data to measure these variables were taken from
the U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1960-1989. [Ref.
8]. As constructed, these ratios are larger when there are
more Democrats than Republicans in the respective unit
measured i.e., the House, Senate, or Combined Houses.
3. Proram-Related Factors
a. Program Type (New Versus Modified)
Hypothesis Seven requires a measure of the
difference between aw and modified programs. For each
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program, one measure was constructed: a "0" was assigned to
programs that were new programs, and a "1" assigned to
programs that were modifications to existing programs. This
measure will quantify the difference between new and
modified programs at their FSD start.
- PRO TYPE: Designation as a new or modified program.
These measures were taken from Appendix A of
Tyson, et al.'s study [Ref. 1]. Table XII-I of this study
identifies the modified programs with an asterisk.
b. Program Stretch Out
Hypothesis Eight requires a measure of how much
a program schedule grows from program start to completion,
while at the same time controlling for schedule increases
that are due to an increase in the quantity planned. For
each program, one measure was constructed by Tyson, et al.
They determined production schedule growth for the life of
the program, and divided it by product quantity growth for
the same period.
Program Stretch Out - Production Schedule Growth
Product Quantity Growth
This ratio reflects the magnitude of program
stretch out for each program. These variables were taken
from Appendix A of Tyson, et al.'s study (Ref. 1].
Note the similarity between Program Stretch Out
and DSG. They differ in that the Program Stretch Out
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variable controls for the effect of changes in quantity over
the development/production period, where DSG is a measure of
the total elapsed time for full scale development.
- PROG S/O: The ratio of production schedule growth to
production quantity growth.
It should also be noted that Tyson, et al.'s
construction of the Program Stretch Out variable does not
explicitly include changes in the development schedule as
part of the measure. Program Stretch Out is nonetheless
argued to be acceptable in the current study for two
reasons: first, many programs have substantial overlap and
compression between the development and production phases.
The B-1B, V-22, and B-2 programs are most recent examples.
Second, Tyson, et al., state that Program atretch Out is a
significant determinant in total program cost growth, a
program outcome examined in this study [Ref. 1:p. V-2).
As an example of Program Stretch Out, a normal
value, indicating no stretch, would be 1.0. A value of 2.0
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In this chapter, sample programs were presented,
listed by weapon system type. The dependent variables were
presented, and Tyson et al.'s methodology for measurement
and construction of the dependent variables discussed.
Finally, the explanatory factorr (independent variables)
were operationalized, and their hypothesized associations
with subsequent cost and schedule growth established.
In the next chapter, the relationships between
the program outcome measures and the explanatory factors
will be evaluated through various statistical tests, and
findings will be presented.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND TEST RESULTS
In Chapter III, the measures used to reflect program
outcomes and explanatory factors were presented and
described. In this chapter, the tests used to perform the
analysis will first be discussed. The results from the
analysis of relationships betweon the program outcomes -nd
explanatory factors conducted using these tests will then be
presented. This chapter contains only presentation and
brief summaries of the results of the statistical tests;
interpretation, generalization, discussion, and conclusions
follow in Chapter V. Each program outcome (development cost
growtL., development schedule growth, total program cost
growth) was examined separately. Tests were conducted on
three separate samples: the full sample, and on two
subsamples: aircraft and non-aircraft. This stratification
was considered logical, because aircraft was the largest
subsample of common weapon system type (n = 31). No other
weapon system subsample was very large, so the remainder
were lumped into the non-aircraft subsample (n - 58).
A. THE TESTS
The tests used during the analysis were univariate
regression analysis, T-tests of means, and multivariate
regression analysis. In describing how and why these tests
were used, the following points shall be discussed: 1) What
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the test did, i.e., what it measured; 2) Why the test was
used; what advantages it possessed that made it desirable,
and how it overcame any disadvantages of the other tests;
3) What the test result (statistic) was, and what
information it provided; 4) The criterion for significance
for each test; and 5) Any comments pertinent to the test's
performance or the results.
1. Univariate Regression Ana", Ja
Univariate or simple regression analysis in essence
describes and quantifies the nature of the relationship
between two variables. By algebraically establishing the
optimum linear relationship between an independent and a
dependent variable, and comparing actual values to values
predicted by the linear model, a conclusion may be reached
about how well the independent variable (explanatory factor)
explains the dependent variable (program outcome).
Univariate regression analysis was used because it
allowed the isolation of a variable's contribution without
concern for the influence of other factors due to
multicollinearity, or the possible effect measurement errors
in other variables may have on the test (a disadvantage of
multivariate regression analysis).
Univariate regression analysis provides a wealth of
descriptive statistics. In the current study two were used:
the coefficient of the explanatory variable, and the
coefficient of determination, adjusted for the degrees of
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freedom. (R-squared, adjusted'). The variable coefficient
provided the nature of the relationship between the program
outcome and explanatory factors, i.e., positive or negative
association. Rsq adj., provided a measure of how well the
explanatory factor explained the program outcome in each
case.
A p-value of .05 was the criterion for significance.
Less than or equal to .05 was regarded as significant,
greater than .05 was not.
Outliers were frequently noted in this analysis.
The largest outliers--as determined by computer software2--
were deleted. For any single test, two or fewer outlier
observations was the rule, and five was the maximum deleted.
2. T-tests of Means
Another type of univariate test, the T-test of
means, was also performed. The essence of this test
involved the creation of two subsamples--one with "low"
values for a given program outcome, the other with "high"
values--and determining if values for individual explanatory
factors differed between these two subsamples. Top and
bottom quartiles were used to form the "high" and "low"
subsamples. For example, programs were ranked on DCG and
the top and bottom groups separated out. Then values for an
'Abbreviated "Rsq adj." in this study.
2Minitab.
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explanatory variable, say Defense Spending, were compared
between the two subsamples by using a T-test for the
difference between the two sample means. Tests were
constructed so that positive (negative) t-values indicated
positive (negative) relationships between the dependent and
independent variables in the test.
This test provided an analysis of the performance or
impact of the explanatory factors at the "low" and "high"
extremes of each of the program outcomes, where the
relationships were expected to be strongest and least
ambiguous.
As with univariate regression analysis, the
criterion for significance was set at a p-value less than
.05.
By excluding all programs that were not "low" or
"high," this test was performed with approximately one-half
the sample size of the other two tests. The result was that
the power of the test was reduced, and only those
comparisons with the greatest difference of means appeared
as significant. This disadvantage is compensated for
somewhat by the univariate regression tests, which used the
entire sample. On the other hand, the t-test does not make
the same linearity assumption inherent in the regression
analysis.
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2. Multivariate Rearession Analysis
Multivariate Regression Analysis was also performed.
This test provided quantification and description of the
relationships between explanatory factors and program
outcomes as did the univariate regression analysis, but
provided control for the influences of other significant
explanatory factors in the process. That is, the level of
significance of any explanatory factor was tempered (or
controlled for) by the presence of other factors.
This test provided a much stronger conceptual result
than either the univariate regression or T-tests. By
indicating which factors may interact in the real world to
influence the program outcomes, it provided an excellent
indication of their overall influence.
As with the univariate regression analysis, the
coefficient of each explanatory variable was recorded as an
indication of the relationship of the explanatory variable
with the program outcome (i.e., positively or negatively
associated). The partial coefficient of determination was
computed and recorded for each significant explanatory
factor as a measure of the strength of its ability to
explain variation in the program outcome. This statistic,
rather than Rsq adj., was used since the purpose of the
multivariate analysis was to establish only which variables
were significant within the test, and not their combined
effGct.
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As with the other two tests, the significance
criterion was a p-value less than .05.
The process of using multivariate regression
analysis was both statistical and heuristic. Numerous
multivariate regression models were constructed, with
judgements made to eliminate observations or variables. The
process included the following steps for each program
outcome: first, each program outcome (dependent variable)
was inspected for normality of distribution. All program
outcomes approximated a normal distribution, and did not
require transformation. Next, the program outcome was
regressed against the entire group of explanatory variables.
Those programs which contained outliers identified by the
computer software were identified, and deleted. Typically,
removed outliers amounted to one or two programs. The
software also identified those measures for explanatory
factors which were excessively intercorrelated with at least
two other factors, and removed them. Explanatory factor
measures removed for multicollinearity ranged from zero to
as many as 11 of the 15. Next, the remaining programs were
regressed. All the explanatory factors with extremely low
T-ratios (less than .5) were then removed. The fourth step
was to run the regression again with the remaining
explanatory variables, removing the variable with the lowest
insignificant T--ratio. The fifth step was to run the
regression again, this time recording and inspecting the
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error terms and the Durbin-Watson test statistic, to ensure
random distribution of the error terms. If all remaining
measures were significant at this point, their variable
coefficients and partial correlation coefficients were
recorded. If not, the sixth step was to remove the
independent variable with the lowest insignificant T-ratio
and repeat steps five and six. Steps five and six were
repeated until only significant independent variables
remained. If fewer than two variables were significant, no
multivariate regression result was considered to exist for
that program outcome. Dashed lines (---) in the tables
represent such results. Thus, uilike the other test result
presentations in the later tables, only significant
multivariate results are displayed.
B. THE RESULTS OF THF ANALYSIS
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of
the statistical tests in table form and briefly summarizes
the explanatory factors that most frequently appear to
explain program outcomes. Interpretation, discussion, and
conclusions to be drawn from the statistical results to be
drawn from the statistical results are included in Chapter
V.
1. Development Cost Growth
The results of the univariate regression, T-tests,
and multivariate regression for Development Cost Growth are
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presented in Tables IV-1 through IV-3. Each significant
result from each test is marked with an asterisk.
TABLE IV-1
DCG, ENTIRE SAMPLE
Univar. Regr. T--tests Multivar. Regr.
T-ratio/ Partial
Indep. Relation- Var. Corr.
Variable Cost. Rga-adj Ship Coef. Coef.
ECON .2s 0.0% 1.14
CAPUTIL .0146 1.4% 0.95
D-CAPUTIL 1.33 0.9% 1.66
DEFSPND -.3X10-1 2.6% -3.14*
D-DEFSPND .37 0.0% -.11
ACQ ENV -.0262* 4.9%* -2.50*
PRES PARTY .236 1.7% -2.53*
HSE RATIO .408 1.4% 2.11*
D-HSE RATIO 1.09* 4.8!k* 1.27
SEN RATIO .418* 3.8%* 2.69*
D-SEN RATIO .056 0.0% .98
CONG RATIO .555* 3.9t* 2.89*
D-CONG RATIO 1.39 1.0% 1.14
PRO TYPE .412* 4.2%* 1.56 ----
PROG S/0 .0049 0.0% 1.01 --
*Significant at < .05.
The most freqtwently encountered significant
explanatory factors in the analysis of DCG were SEN RATIO,
ACQ ENV, and DEF SPND. The ECON, D-SEN RATIO, and D-CONG
RALTIO explanatory factors never appeared as significant




Tjnivar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Variable Coef. Rsa-adj T-ratio Coef. Coef.
ECON 3.49 1.9% 1.31----
CAPUTIL .0295* 23.7%* 1.69 - -
D-CAPUTIL 2.54* 22.5%* 1.66 .156* .31*
DEFSPND -. 4X105* 20.2%* -3.06*--
D-DEFSPND -.714 0.0% -1.60 .230* .83*
ACQ ENV -.0329* 21.6%* -3.16*
PRES PARTY -.376* 14.9%* -1.00
HSE RATIO .516* 9.9%* .49
D-HSE RATIO -.876 0.7% 0.0 .142* .44*
SEN RATIO .699* 33.74* 2.33* .290* .54*
D-SEN RATIO -.229 0.0% -.26--
CONG RATIO .829* 30.3%* 1.78
D-CONG RATIO 1.13 0.0% -.62
PRO TYPE 3.49 1.9% 1.31----
PROG S/0 .169 4.7% 1.88 .200* .37*
* Significant at < .05.
suboamples. The ACQ ENV, SEN RATIO, and CONG RATIO
explanatory factors were the most frequently occurring for
the full sample. In the aircraft subsample, SEN RATIO
occurred most frequently, and DEF SPND and D-HSE RATIO both





Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Variable Coef. Rsg-adj T-ratio Coef. Coef.
ECON .23 0.0% -.12
CAPUTIL .0052 0.0% -.01 ......
D-CAPUTIL -.57 0.0% .84
DEFSPND -.2X10 "5  .1% -2.33*
D-DEFSPND .66 0.0% .82
ACQ ENV -.0253 2.8% -1.75
PRES PARTY -.078 0.0% -1.31
HSE RATIO .168 0.0% .96
D-HSE RATIO 2.06* 7.7%* 1.35
SEN RATIO .236 0.0% 1.44
D-SEN RATIO -.29 0.0% 1.37
CONG RATIO .286 0.0% 1.74
D-CONG RATIO .974 1.5% 1.43 --- I
PRO TYPE .337 2.1% 1.03
PROG S/O .0003 0.0% .90
* Significant at < .05.
The aircraft subsample had the largest number of significant
explanatory factors within it, followed by the full sample.
The non-aircraft subsample had the fewest.
C. TOTAL PROGRAM COST GROWTH
Tables IV-4 through IV-6 contain the results for TPCG.
The three most frequently occurring significant explanatory




TUnivar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Variable Coef. Rsa-adi T-ratio 0f C2j'
ECON 3.45 0.0% 1.13
CAPUTIL -.5X105'* 5.7%* .71
D-CAPUTIL 2.13 3.0% 1.35--
DEFSPND -.458* 7.7% -3.07*--
D-DEFSPNlD .33 0.0% -.27--
ACQ ENV -.0338* 7.1%* -2.18*--
PRES PARTY -.32* 15.1%* -3.28*--
HSE RATIO 1.08* 15.1%* 3.87* .78* .415*
D-HSE RATIO 2.79* 16.5%* 2-06* - -
SEN RATIO 1.15* 18.0%* 2.48*--
D-SEN RATIO -.627 0.0% .15--
CONG RATIO 1.15* 15.0%* 3.27*--
D-CONG RATIO 2.07 3.3% 1.20
PRO TYPE .0691 3.5% 1.95-- -
PROG S/0 3.45 0.0% 1.20 .124* .34*
* Significant at < .05.
SEN RATIO. ECON, D-SEN RATIO, and PRO TYPE were not
significant in any test for TPCG.
The HSE RATIO factor was the most pervasive explanatory
factor in the full sample, significant in all three test
results. Five different explanatory factors appeared in two
of three test in the. aircraft subsample: HSE RATIO, SEN
RATIO, CONG RATIO, DEFSPND, and D-DEFSPND. Three factors
TABLE IV-5
TPCG, AIRCRAFT SUBSAMPLE
Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Variable Coef. Rs-adj T-ratio Coef. Coef.
ECON -2.22 2.1% .23 ---
CAPUTIL .00291 0.0% .35 ---
D-CAPUTIL .974 4.3% -.54 ---
DEFSPND -. 3X10"4 39.5%* -.96
D-DEFSPND -2.12* 38.1%* -3.42*
ACQ ENV -.0271* 39.1%* -4.38*
PRES PARTY -.341* 39.3%* -1.00 ---
HSE RATIO .417* 17.7%* 2.25*
D-HSE RATIO 1.05 6.5% .86
SEN RATIO .543* 56.1%* 3.67*
D-SEN RATIO -.233 0.0% -.40
CONG RATIO .682* 51.9%* 4.00* ---
D-CONG RATIO .419 0.0% 4.00*
PRO TYPE -.097 0.0% -.53
PROG S/0 .0574 0.0% .36 ---
* Significant at < .05.
were significant in two of three tests in the non-aircraft
subsample: PRES PARTY, CONG RATIO, and PROG S/O.
The full sample had thQ largest number of
significant explanatory factors within it, followed by the





Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Var .... Coef. Rog-al- T-ratio Coef. Coef.
ECON 7.08 2.0% 1.66
CAPUTIL .0182 1.1% .16
D-CAPUTIL 1.63 0.0% -.10
DEFSPND -.5XlO "6  4.7% -2.24*
D-DEFSPND .89 0.0% -2.16*
ACQ ENV -.0267 2.2% -1.21
PRES PARTY .366 1.0% -1.76
HSE RATIO .60* 12.0%* 3.38*
D-HSE RATIO 3.23* 20.6%* .61 2.10* .17*
SEN RATIO .659 5.6% 2.75*
D-SEN RATIO .471 0.0% 1.46 ---
CONG RATIO 1.2* 11.9%* 2.60* ...
D-CONG RATIO 3.12 6.7% -.95 ---
PRO TYPE -.086 0.0% 1.12
PROG S/O .119* 8.0%* 1.34 .253* .37*
* Significant at < .05.
D. DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE GROWTH
The results of analysis for DSG are presented in Tables
IV-7 through IV-9. The most frequently observed significant
explanatory factors for DSG were HSE RATIO, D-HSE RATIO, and
CONG RATIO. The zost frequently occurring factor in the
full sample was HSE RATIO, significant in all three tests.
The CONG RATIO factor was the only factor significant in any




Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
mmia-I e -~ f. Rsg-adl T-ai Coef,
ECON .67 0.0% .74
CAPUTIL .00971 1.1% -.19
*D-CAPUTIL 1.07 1.6% 1.35
DEFSPND -.1X10-5 0.1% -1.01
*D-DEFSPND .398 0.0% -.22
ACO ENV -.0118 1.4% -.37
PRES PARTY -.224* 4.0%* -.98
HSE RATIO .635* 11.7%* 2.05* .423* .17*
D-HSE RATIO 1.63* 13.S%* 1.66 1.12* .05*
SEN RATIO .594 10.6% 1.23
D-SEN RATIO .092 0.0% -.16
CONG RATIO .466* 12.B%* 1.77--
D-CONG RATIO 1.54* 4.4%* 1.37----
PRO TYPE .0462* 3.8%* 3.02* .502* .21*
PROG 5/0 .0411 0.0% .12 .116* .075*
* Significant at < .05.
test. Seven different factors were significant in one test
in the non-aircraft subsample (see Table IV-9). The ECON,
* CAPUTIL, D-CAPUTIL, DEFSPND, and ACQ ENV were not




Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Carr.
VariabLe Coef. Rsa-Adlt T-ratio Coef. CoAL..
ECON .38 0.0% .68
CAPUTIL .00062 0.0% -.92
D-CAPUTIL .031 0.0% -.39
DEFSPND -. 1X10-6  .4% -.88
D-DEFSPND -.701 3.7% -.85
ACQ ENV .004 0.0% -.42
PRES PARTY -.132 5.7% -.83
HSE RATIO .204 5.04 .74
D-HSE RATIO -.257 0.0% .72
SEN RATIO .149 4.0% .57
D-SEN RATIO 1.17 2.5% 1.07
CONG RATIO .23* 7.1%* .73
D-CONG RATIO .257 0.0% 1.27
PRO TYPE .063 0.0% -.60
PROG S/O .11 5.2% 1.79




Univar. Regr. T-tests Multivar. Regr.
Partial
Indep. Var. Var. Corr.
Variable Coef. Ra-adJ T-raltio C'oef, Coef.
ECON .93 0.0% .91
CAPUTIL .0103 0.2% -.17
D-CAPUTIL -.01 0.0% -.43
DEFSPND -. 1X1O51 0.0% -. 96
D-DEFSPND .562 0.0% 3.16*
ACQ ENV .018 3.2% -.83
PRES PARTY -.138 0.0% -.70
HSE RATIO .726* 9.8%* 1.99
D-HSE RATIO 2.57* 29..4%* -.34
SEN RATIO *379* 4.7%* 1.37
D-SEN RATIO .009 0.0% 2.35*
CONG PATIO .660* 9.2%* 1.78
D-CONG PATIO 2.55* l1.5%* -.72
PRO TYPE .111 0.0% 2.37*
PROG S/O .0163 0.0% .54
* Significant at < .05.
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
Across all tests on all samples, HSE RATIO arnd CONG
RATIO were the most frequently significant explanatory
factors, followed by SEN RATIO and D-HSE RATIO. Only ECON
failed to occur in any test for any sample.
The explanatory factor occurring most frequently In the
three full sample tests was HSE RATIO. The ECON, DEFSPND
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and D-CONG RATIO explanatory factors were the least
frequently occurring in these tests.
For tests conducted on aircraft subsamples, SEN RATIO
and CONG RATIO were the most frequently occurring
significant explanatory factors. The least frequently
occurring were D-CONG RATIO again, and PRO TYPE, neither of
which was significant in any test. For the non-aircraft
subsamples, DEFSPND and D-HSE RATIO were the most frequently
significant explanatory factors. Six explanatory factors
(besides ECON) were never significant on any test result for
these sub-aples: CAPUTIL, D-DEFSPND, ACQ ENV, SEN RATIO,
CONG RATIV, and PROG S/O.
In this chapter, each of the three program outcome
factors were tested for significant relationshipr with the
explanatory factors. The tests used were univariate and
multivariate regression, and T-tests of means. These tests
were conducted on three separate samples for each program
outcome: the full sample, the aircraft program subsample,
and the non-aircraft subsample. The statistical results
were presented and summarized.
These findings will be used in the next chapter to
develop conclusions regarding the hypothesized relationships
between the program outcomes and the explanatory factors.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, the analysis conducted in the earlier
chapters will be summarized. This will be followed by a
discussion of the conclusions that may be drawn from the
results of the analysis. Limitations and constraints
encountered in this study will then be briefly reviewed,
followed by suggestions for future research in areas related
to this study.
A. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
The intent of this study has been to establish the
nature and extent of relationships between cost and schedule
growth during weapons system acquisition and economic,
political, and program-related explanatory factors.
In Chapter II, the results of a review of the literature
to identify possible explanatory factors influencing cost
and schedule growth were presented. A scenario relating
each factor to cost and schedule growth was also presented,
along with a formal hypothesis stating the expected
relationship.
Chapter III was devoted to describing tli( sample, the
measures of cost and schedule growth, and the measures of
the explanatory factors that would be used in the subsequent
analysis. Three program outcome measures were chosen for
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analysis in this at 'Development Cost Growth, Total
Program Cost Growth, and Development Schedule Growth.
In Chapter IV, the various tests used in the analysis
were presented and discussed. The results of the analysis
were then presented in tabular form, and summarized.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study is to draw some initial
general conclusions concerning the relationship between
economic/political conditions and program outcomes. Doing
so requires abstracting some broad findings from the
detailed statistical results. This process is hampered by
three characteristics of the analysis:
- The use of several types of statistical tests to
examine the same hypothesized relationship.
- Conducting the tests on multiple samples.
- The examination of multiple program outcomes.
- The use of multiple, sometimes related variables to
measure a single broad construct.
A difficulty in drawing general conclusions is encountered
when tho, results from the from the multiple tests, samples,
outcomes and measures are not the same.
The solution selected to counter this problem was to
look for broad patterns in the results. Fundamentally, more
attention was paid to results that were: a) significant;
b) consistent across statistical tests; and c) consistent
across the samples.
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In order to identify patterns to graphically portray the
results, Table V-I was created. It is acknowledged that
such a "summary table" is not a perfect solution to the
problem, because the tests are not statistically
independent, and because counting a number of individual
significant results does not fully reflect the differences
in strength that each individual result may possess.
Nonetheless, it is a workable solution to the problem,
allowing the synthesis and generalization needed to reach
conclusions.
An examination of the table brings several points into
focus. First, three measures of Congressional Majority
Party--HSE RATIO, SEN RATIO, and CONG RATIO--stand out
clearly as the most pervasive, in both the number of teats
and samples in which they are significant. Note, however,
that these results are inconsistent with the hypothesized
relationships. According to the results, Democratic
congressional majorities, not Republican, are associated
with increased cost and schedule growth.
This result cannot be easily explained. One possible
explanation is that when Democrats hold the majority in
Congress, they are able to reduce appropriations for
established programs, leading to program stretch out, which












DEFSPND * ** * ** * *
D-DEFSPND * ** *
ACQ ENV II II II II
PRES PARTY / / // / //
HSE RATIO / / /// // 1/ ///
D-HSE RATIO / I / /I 1/ II
SEN RATIO II III II II I
D-SEN RATIO
CONG RATIO I/ / // /1 // /
D-CONG RATIO / /
PRO TYPE / //
PROG S/O ** *
LEGEND: F - Full Sample
A - Aircraft Subsample
N - Non-aircraft Subsample
KEY: *** - 3 of 3 Tests Significant; Hypothesized
Relationship
S* - 2 of 3 Tests Significant; Hypothesized
Relationship
* - 1 of 3 Tests Significant; Hypothesized
Relationship
- 3 of 3 Tests Significant; Opposite
Relationship
// - 2 of 3 Tests Significant; Opposite
Relationship
/ - 1 of 3 Tests Significant; Opposite
Relationship
Another scenario is that, when Democrats have stronger
control of Congress, Presidential administrations,
particularly Republican, bias initial cost estimates
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downward in an attempt to gain program acceptance. Cost
growth then results when actual costs are higher. This
scenario is not fully compatible with the results noted for
the Presidential Party explanatory factor, however. In that
result, Republican presidents are associated with relatively
lower cost and schedule growth. Nonetheless, these results
do suggest that programs initiated under both Democratically
dominated Congresses and Democratic Presidential administra-
tions have been characterized by greater cost and schedule
growth.
Another point of interest is the complete lack of
significance of Economy Wide Conditions. This seems
contrary to the common sense notion that places the economy
at the heart of all market-related transactions.
One possible explanation for this factor's lack of
significance may be that the measure of change in economic
condition was not of sufficient duration to reflect aspects
of the economy that would impact cost or schedule outcomes.
Table V-1 also makes clear that TPCG was the program
outcome best explained by the explanatory factors, followed
by DCG and DSG. This brings up a couple of additional
points. First, weapon system cost growth appears to be much
more strongly related to the influence of political and
economic factors than is schedule growth: TPCG and DCG each
have noticeably more significant results as does DSG. This
seems to make sense, since the mechanism for controlling
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most weapon system programs is cost, not time. This
suggests that schedule growth is a by-product of cost
growth. Second, since TPCG is the only program outcome
measure which reflects performance during production, its
dominance in this study underscores the need for additional
study of production phase cost and schedule growth.
Finally, it is apparent that the full sample contained
the largest number of significant results across all three
program outcomes, followed by the aircraft subsample. This
is not a surprising result, since the full sample was much
larger than either of the subsamples. What is somewhat
surprising is that the aircraft subsample (n - 31) had half
again as many significant results as the non-aircraft
subsample (n - 58). This result is important because it
points out rather dramatically the importance of homogeneous
sample groups. The explanatory ability of the tests were
significantly greater for the smaller, homogeneous aircraft
subsample, where differences in equipment type was in effect
controlled for.
C. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
Certain aspects of this study placed constraints upon
the analysis, contributing to the ambiguity of results and
reducing the facility of drawing more substantive
conclusions. Limitations related to hypothesis
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construction, sample size, sample composition, measures
used, and statistical tests all merit comment.
1. HvPothesis Construction
The objective of constructing the hypotheses was to
put a relatively simple conceptual "handle" on complex
relationships involving real-life phenomena. In reducing
complex interactions to a simple, testable form, however,
much of the richness of real-life is ignored. Since the
true nature of the relationships being explored is
ambiguous, simple direct tests of simple direct hypotheses
may miss providing evidence of relationships that are more
subtle. Reducing phenomena to simple, testable
relationships is a reasonable approach in an initial study.
Future studies however could benefit from more complex
hypotheses, particularly concerning presidential and
congressional parties. Testing hypotheses that capture
interactions between the two branches of government would
likely provide future insight into pressures that influence
cost estimates and cost growth.
2. SAR6 L
Tyson, et al.'s sample of 89 programs was originally
considered adequate to meet the needs of the planned tests.
As the desirability of stratifying the sample became
apparent, however, the sample size was less suitable. This
was most perceptible in the T-tests. Due to the method of
their construction, as few as eight programs were available
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for the "low" and "high" mean calculations, significantly
reducing the power of these tests.
Regression analysis in the aircraft subsamples were
impacted, as well. These samples were reduced from their
original size of 31 programs to as few as 21, due to missing
data items for some of the explanatory factors and outlier
removal. This reduced the sensitivity of the test,
increasing the required value of the T-statistic to achieve
the desired level of confidence in the test result.
3. Saonle Composition
The composition of the sample--many different types
of programs over a period of several decades--may also have
created a problem in reaching more consistent results. This
was demonstrated by the comparison of results for the
aircraft and non-aircraft subsamples made in the
conclusions. By including all non-aircraft systems in one
subsample, many different kinds of programs were brought
together to try and explain a single program outcome. The
results, as might be expected, were more less significant
than when all observations were of the same kind, as in the
aircraft subsample.
4. Measures
One of the benefits of using Tyson, et al.'s program
outcome measures was that they were already constructed and
conceptually rather simple. A drawback, however, was that
the raw data used for construction were not included in
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their study. Had these data been available, dates for the
start and end of the production phase would have been
available. Knowledge of these dates would have permitted an
expanded, more comprehensive analysis, in two respects.
First, relationships between explanatory factors and
production cost/schedule gzowth could have been conducted.
Second, measures of the explanatory factors at various
different points in time during the duration of a program
could have been constructed. Instead, the explanatory
measure used in this study primarily reflected conditions
only at the start of FSD. These limitations result in the
current conclusions being only preliminary.
5. Statistical Tests Used
An noted in Chapter IV, each of 'the tests used had
certain drawbacks that were to varying degrees compensated
for by the inclusion of one or both of the other tests. The
need to use three different tests, each with its own
individual statistical result created diffiilty In drawing
overall, general conclusions when individual test results
were inconsistent. This limitation can not be "corrected"
per se, but is important to remember when interpreting this
study's results and evaluating its conclusions.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Your issues were identified during the course of this
study that warrant further research. These issues were:
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ill IN
Production Cost and Schedule Growth, the relationship of
Congressional Majority Party to the program outcomes, the
relationship of Economy Wide Conditions to the program
outcomes, and the relationship of Program Type to the
program outcomes.
While this study does provide some preliminary
indications about the relationships between cost and
schedule growth and political and economic factors, it falls
well short of developing useful tools for potential users.
In future studies, program outcome and explanatory factors
constructed using production phase as well as development
phase data should be developed.
The cause of the positive correlation between
Congressional Majority Party and cost and schedule growth
deserves further analysis, as well. As noted in the
conclusions, Democratic Party majorities in Congress were
associated with relatively greater cost and schedule growth,
yet there was no fully satisfactory explanation for this
conclusion consistent with the finding for presidential
party.
Finally, the effect of Program Type needs further
evaluation. This factor's poor explanatory ability in this
study runs counter to what common sense would indicate:
modified programs should experience less cost and schedule
growth. As noted, one problem encountered in this study was
the lack of production phase data. Intuitively, this was
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the area where the most significant reductions in cost and
schedule growth should be realized, through the effect of
learning curves. The question of how Program Type
influences cost and/or schedule growth is still open;
additional study is needed to close it.
This study has taken a preliminary step in the
identification and investigation of some of the less
technical--but critically important--factors that make up
and impact the slow and expensive weapon procurement system.
Further research in the areas of politics and economics
may provide insights that military and civilian budgeters,
program managers, and policy makers can employ to contain
the costs in time and money of providing the U.S. Military




COST. SCHEDULE AND EXPLANATORY FACTORAURES
Program
Name Contractor DCG DSG TPCG
V-22 BELL/BOEING 0.99 1 0.94
T45TS MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 0.44 1.04 0.97
B-lA ROCKWELL 1.1 1.17 *
C-5B LOCKHEED 1 0.77 *
C-17A MCDONELL DOUGLASS 1.2 1.05 1.04
C-5A LOCKHEED 0.98 1.18 1.77
B-lB ROCKWELL 0.96 . 0.95
FB-111A GENERAL DYNAMICS 2.57 1.4; *
AV-GA MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 0.99 1 *
F-5E NORTHROP 1.05 1.06 *
F-15 MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 1.07 1.03 1.16
F-16 GENERAL DYNAMTCS 1.05 0.98 1.19
F-14D GRUMMAN 1.07 1 0.82
F-14A GRUYA 1.44 1.16 1.28
AV-SB MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 1.11 0.83 0.82
A-10 FAIRCHILD 1.27 1.08 1.33
F/A-18 MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 1.15 1.08 1.37
E-6A BOEING 1.12 1.27 *
E-3A BOEING 1.37 1.16 1.25
EF-I11A GRUMMAN 2.1 1.7 1.73
E-2C GRUMMAN 1.5 0.76 *
EA-6B GRUMMAN 1.26 1 *
P-3C LOCKHEED 1.8 1 1.42
LAMPSMK3 SIKORST(Y 1.04 1 1.13
E-4 BOEING 1.88 1.59 1.07
S-3A LOCKHEED 1.09 1 1.3
CH-47D BOEING VERTOL 1.10 1.06 1.33
011-58D BELL 0.98 1.2 1.26
UH-60A SIKORSKY 1.08 1.07 1.22
AJR--64A HUGHES/M.D.HELO 1.2.6 1.49 1.59
CHF,y ENNE SINORSKY 2.C9 1 *
PHOENIX - A HfGHES 1.54 1.07 1.39
AMRAA, HUGHES 1.44 1.8 1.06
HELLFIRE ROCKWELL 1.09 1.44 1.39
HARM TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 2.03 1.05 1.47
SPARROW F GENERAL DYNAMICS 4.25 3.9 1.74
TOW HUGHES 1.2 1.45 1.7
SIDEWINDER L FORD AERO 4.89 2.45 2.25
TOW2 HUGHES 1.7 1.02 0.98
HARPOON MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 1.3.7 1.36 1.53
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MAVERICK D/G HUGHES 1.07 1.98 1.53
SPARROW E GENERAL DYNAMICS 0.84 1 1.07
SPARROW M GENERAL DYNAMICS 0.98 1.46 1.29
SIDEWINDER M FORD AERO 2.04 .1.01 1.1
PHOENIX C HUGHES 1.67 1.45 1.93
ADDS HUGHES 1.32 1.54 *
MLS BENDIX 0.83 1.08 *
JTIDS HUGHES 3.11 1.46 *
JSTARS GRUMMAN 1.18 1 *
WIS ITT 1.6 2.11 *
Program
Name Contractor DCG DSG TPCG
SINCGARS ITT 1.35 1.29 *
ASPJ ITT 2.36 1.69 *
LANTIRN MARTIN MARIETTA 0.96 1 *
TRI TAC SYLVANIA 1.03 1 *
OTH B GENERAL ELECTRIC 1.22 1.44 *
DMSP RCA 1 1 0.95
NAVSTAR GPS ROCKWELL 0.99 1.44 1.08
DSP TRV 1.35 1 1.06
DSCS III GENERAL ELECTRIC 2.54 1.59 1.99
ROLAND BOEING 1.52 2.15 4.17
IMP. HAWK RAYTHEON 1.87 1.25 1.48
SHELLAGH MARTIN MARIETTA 1.31 1.05 1.45
MK 48 AD HUGHES 1.01 1.35 1.73
MLRS LTV MISSLES 1.03 1 0.95
MK 50 HONEYWELL 1.27 1.29 1.08
STINGER P GENERAL DYNAMICS 1.02 1.95 *
MK 48 GOULD , 0.89 1.08
STINGER B/A GENERAL DYNAMICS 1.,*6 2.46 1.75
COPPERHEAD MARTIN MARIETTA 1.28 1.75 2.12
DIVAD FORD AERO 1.6 1.74 2.33
F.VE INCH MARTIN MARIETTA .16 1 *
STINGER R GENERAL DYNAMICS 1.02 1.18 *
DRAGON MCDONNELL DOUGLASS 1.88 2.14 2.6
PERSHING 2 MARTIN MARIETTA 1 0.83 1.67
PATRIOT RAYTHEON 1.4 1.15 1.67
STD MISSLE 2 GENERAL DYNAMICS 1.44 1 0.96
LANCE LTV MISSLES 1.08 1.46 1.12
PEACEKEEPER MARTIN MARIETTA 0.96 1 1.28
GLCM GENERAL DYNAMICS 3.48 1.3 1.67
TOMAHAWK GENERAL DYNAMICS 1.66 1.48 1.57
SRAM II BOEING 1 1.19 0.81
MINUTEMAN2 BOEING 1 1.71 1.06
TRIDENT 2 LOCKHEED 0.93 1 0.97
ICBM MARTIN MARIETTA 0.31 1 *
ALCM BOEING 1.37 1.34 1.17
SRAM BOEING 2.8 2.03 3.39
MINUTEMAN3 BOEING 0.98 0.87 1.39
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CONDOR ARGENTINA 1.72 3 5.19
MAVERICK A HUGHES 1.15 1.46 0.95
Program ACQ PRES
Name ENV CAPUTIL D-CAPJTIL DEFSPND D-DEFSPND PARTY
V-22 86 * * 273375 0.08 1
T45TS 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
B-lA 70 69.83 -0.15 81692 0.05 1
C-SB 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
C-17A 85 * * 252748 0 1
C-5A 65 83.76 0.03 50620 -0.08 0
B-IB 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
FB-11A 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
AV-SA 70 69.83 -0.15 81692 0.05 1
F-SE 72 67.43 0.06 79174 0 1
F-15 70 69.83 -0.15 81692 0.05 1
F-16 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
F-14D 84 * * 227413 0.08 1
F-.14A 69 82.28 -0.05 82497 0.01 1
AV-8B 80 86.8 -0.02 133995 0.15 1
A-,10 73 74.28 0.1 76681 -0.03 1
F/A-18 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
E-6A 83 * -1 209903 0.13 1
E-3A 70 69.83 -0.15 81692 0.05 1
EF-I1A 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
E-2C 70 69.83 -0.15 86509 0.05 1
EA-6B 68 87.02 -0.05 81926 0.15 1
P-3C 65 83.76 0.03 50620 -0.08 0
LAMPSMK3 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
E-4 73 74.28 0.1 76681 -0.03 1
S-3A 69 82.28 -0.05 82497 0.01 1
CH-47D 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
OH-58D 81 78.83 -0.09 157513 0.18 1
UH-60A 72 67.43 0.06 79174 0 1
AH-64A 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
CHEYENNE 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
PHOENIX - A 62 77.18 0.15 52345 0.09 0
AMRAAM 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
HELLFIRE 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
HARM 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
SPARROW F 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
TOW 63 83.02 0.08 53400 0.02 0
SIDEWINDER L 71 63.48 -0.09 78872 -0.03 1
TOW2 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
HARPOON 73 74.28 0.1 76681 -0.03 1
MAVERICK D/G 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
SPARROW E 60 66.91 -0.05 48130 -0.02 0
SPAPROW M 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
SIDEWINDER M 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
PHOENIX C 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
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ADDS 85 * * 252748 0.11 1
MLS 88 * * 290361 0.03 1
JTIDS 81 78.83 -0.09 157513 0.18 1
JSTARS 84 * * 227413 0.08 1
Program ACQ PRES
Name ENV CAPUTIL D-CAPUTIL DEFSPND D-DEFSPND PARTY
WIS 85 * * 252748 0.11 1
SINCG;MS 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
ASPJ 81 78.83 -0.09 157513 0.18 1
LANTIRN 80 86.8 -0.02 133995 0.15 1
TRI TAC 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
OTH B 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
DMSP 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
NAVSTAR GPS 79 88.87 0.12 116342 0.11 0
DSP 67 91.23 -0.01 71417 0.23 0
DSCS III 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
ROLAND 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
IMP. HAWK 64 81.66 -0.02 54757 0.03 0
SHELLAGH 59 70.46 * 49015 * 1
MK 48 AD 82 68.88 -0.13 185309 0.18 1
MLRS 76 69.17 0 89619 0 0
MK 50 83 * -1 209903 0.13 1
STINGER P 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
MK 48 68 87.02 -0.05 81926 0.15 0
STINGER B/A 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
COPPERHEAD 75 71.43 0 86509 0 0
DIVAD 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
FIVE INCH 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
STINGER R 84 * * 227413 0.08 1
DRAGON 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
PERSHING 2 79 88.87 0.12 116342 0.11 0
PATRIOT 72 67.43 0.06 79174 0 1
STD MISSLE 2 72 67.43 0.06 79174 0 1
LANCE 67 91.23 -0.01 71417 0.23 0
PEACEKEEPER 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
GLCM 78 79.39 0.11 104495 0.07 0
TOMAHAWK 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
SRAM II 87 * * 281999 0.03 1
MINUTEMAN2 65 83.76 0.03 50620 -0.08 0
TRIDENT 2 83 * -1 209903 0.13 1
ICBM 86 * * 273375 0.08 1
ALCM 77 71.38 0.03 97241 0.09 0
SRAM 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
MINUTEMAN3 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
CONDOR 66 91.82 0.1 58111 0.15 0
MAVERICK A 68 87.02 -0.05 81926 0.15 1
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Program HSE D-HSE SEN D-SEN CONG D-CONG
Name RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO
V-22 1.43 -0.02 1.17 0 1.3 -0.01
T45TS 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
B-IA 1.3 -0.01 1.33 0 1.315 0
C-5B 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
C-17A - 1.46 0 1.17 0 1.315 0
C-5A 1.65 0.15 2.13 0.05 1.89 0.09
B-lB 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
FB-111A 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
AV-SA 1.3 -0.01 1.33 0 1.315 0
F-5E 1.37 0 1.33 0.08 1.35 0.04
F-15 1.3 -0.01 1.33 0 1.315 0
F-16 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
F-14D 1.39 -0.09 1.13 0.27 1.26 0.05
F-14A 1.31 -0.01 1.33 -0.25 1.32 -0.15
AV-SB 1.28 -0.15 0.83 -0.05 1.055 -0.11
A-10 1.29 -0.06 1.39 0.05 1.34 -0.01
F/A-18 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
E-6A 1.52 -0.05 0.89 0.09 1.205 0
E-3A 1.3 -0.01 1.33 0 1.315 0
EF-IIIA 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
E-2C 1.3 -0.01 1.33 0 1.315 0
EA-6B 1.32 -0.26 1.78 0 1.55 -0.13
P-3C 1.65 0.15 2.13 0.05 1.89 0.09
LAMPSMK3 1.89 -0.06 1.41 -0.12 1.65 -0.09
E-4 1.29 -0.06 1.39 0.05 1.34 -C.01
S-3A 1.31 -0.01 1.33 -0.25 1.32 -0.15
CH-47D 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
OH-58D 1.39 0.09 0.85 0.02 1.12 0.06
UH-60A 1.37 0 1.33 0.08 1.35 0.04
AH-64A 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
CHEYENNE 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
PHOENIX - A 1.51 -0.07 1.78 -0.04 1.645 -0.11
AMRAAM 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
HELLFIRE 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
HARM 1.72 -0.09 1.41 0 1.565 -0.05
SPARROW F 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
TOW 1.47 -0.03 2.03 0.14 1.75 0.06
SIDEWINDER L 1.37 0.05 1.23 -0.08 1.3 -0.01
TOW2 1.72 -0.09 1.41 0 1.565 -0.05
HARPOON 1.29 -0.06 1.39 0.05 1.34 -0.01
MAVERICK D/G 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
SPARROW E 1.83 * 1.86 * 1.845 *
SPARROW M 1.72 -0.09 1.41 0 1.565 -0.05
SIDEWINDER M 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
PHOENIX C 1.89 -0.06 1.41 -0.12 1.65 -0.09
ADDS 1.46 0.05 1.17 0.04 1.315 0.04
MLS * * * * * *
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JTIDS 1.39 0.09 0.85 0.02 1.12 0.06
JSTARS 1.39 -0.09 1.13 0.27 1.26 0.05
Program HSE D-HSE SEN D-SEN CONG D-CONG
Name RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO RATIO
WIS 1.46 0.05 1.17 0.04 1.315 0.04
SINCGARS 1.72 -0.09 1.41 0 1.565 -0.05
ASPJ 1.39 0.09 0.85 0.02 1.12 0.06
LANTIRN 1.28 -0.15 0.83 -0.05 1.055 -0.11
TRI TAC 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
OTH B 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
DMSP 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
NAVSTAR GPS 1.51 
-0.12 0.87 -0.38 1.19 -0.24
DSP 1.78 -0.15 1.78 -0.12 1.78 -0.14
DSCS III 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
ROLAND 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
IMP. HAWK 1.44 -0.02 2.03 0 1.735 -0.01
SHELLAGH * * * , * ,
MK 48 AD 1.6 0.15 0.82 -0.04 1.21 0.08
MLRS 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
MK 50 1.52 -0.05 0.89 0.09 1.205 0
STINGER P 1.89 -0.06 1.41 
-0.12 1.65 -0.09
MK 48 1.32 -0.26 1.78 0 1.55 -0.13
STINGER B/A 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
COPPERHEAD 2.01 0 1.61 0 1.81 0
DIVAD 1.89 -0.06 1.41 -0.12 1.65 -0.09
FIVE INCH 1.89 -0.06 1.41 -0.12 1.65 -0.09
STINGER R 1.39 -0.09 1.13 0.27 1.26 0.05
DRAGON 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
PERSHING 2 1.51 -0.12 0.87 -0.38 1.19 -0.24
PATRIOT 1.37 0 1.33 0.08 1.35 0.04
STD MISSLE 2 1.37 0 1.33 0.08 1.35 0.04
LANCE 1.78 -0.15 1.78 
-0.12 1.78 -0.14
PEACEKEEPER 1.72 -0.09 1.48 0 1.6 -0.05
GLCM 1.72 -0.09 1.48 0 1.6 -0.05
TOMAHAWK 1.89 -0.06 1.41 
-0.12 1.65 -0.09
SRAMII * -1 * -1 0 -1
MINUTEMAN2 1.65 0.15 2.13 0.05 1.89 0.09
TRIDENT 2 1.52 -0.05 0.89 0.09 1.205 0
ICBM 1.43 -0.02 1.17 0 1.3 -0.01
ALCM 1.89 -0.06 1.41 -0.12 1.65 -0.09
SRAM 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
MINUTEMAN3 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
CONDOR 2.09 0.27 2.03 -0.05 2.06 0.09
MAVERICK A 1.32 -0.26 1.78 0 1.55 -0.13
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Program PROG
Name PRO TYPE S/O ECON
V-22 0 1,68 0.032
T45TS 1 1 -0.026
B-IA 0 * 0.036
C-5B 1 0.99 -0.026
C-17A 0 0.92 0.039
C-SA 0 1.803 -0.02
B-lB 1 1 -0.026
FB-111A 1 * 0.014
AV-SA 0 1.0417 0.036
F-5E 1 * -0.026
F-15 0 1.9425 0.036
F-16 0 0,7952 0.021
F-14D 1 0.5723 -0.08
F-14A 0 2.5238 -0.037
AV-8B 1 1.5488 0.014
A-10 0 0.98 0.032
F/A-18 0 1.1793 -0.037
E-6A 0 * 0.028
E-3A 0 3.2027 0.036
EF-I11A 1 1.86 0.021
E-2C 1 * 0.036
EA-6B 1 * 0.01
P-3C 1 1.6667 -0.02
LAMPSMK3 0 1.89 0.002
E-4 0 2 0.032
S-3A 0 1.0526 -0.037
CH-47D 1 0.8182 0.021
OH-58D 1 3 -0.015
UH-60A 0 1 -0.026
AH-64A 0 0.8095 -0.037
CHEYENNE 0 * 0.014
PHOENIX - A 0 1.2245 -0.046
AMRAAM 0 1.11 -0.026
HELLFIRE 0 1.202 -0.037
HARM 0 1.5333 0.03
SPARROW F 1 1.1627 0.014
TOW 0 3.8475 -0.003
SIDEWINDER L 1 2.2439 -0,014
TOW2 1 1.0562 0.03
HARPOON 0 3.2105 0.032
MAVERICK D/G 1 1.0974 -0.037
SPARROW E 1 9.1471 *
SPARROW M 1 1.1667 0.03
SIDEWINDER M 1 1.0749 -0.037
PHOENIX C 1 0.7794 0.002
ADDS 0 * 0.039
MLS 0 * 0.063
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JTIDS 0 * -0.015
JSTARS 0 * -0.08
Program PROG
Name PRO TYPE S/O
WIS 0 * 0.039
SINCGARS 0 * 0.03
ASPJ 0 * -0.015
LANTIRN 0 * 0.014
TRI TAC 0 * 0.021
OTH B 0 * -0.026
DMSP 0 0.885 -0.037
NAVSTAR GPS 0 1.2164 0.001
DSP 0 0.8163 0.014
DSCS III 0 1.0833 -0.037
ROLAND 1 5.3333 0.021
IMP. HAWK 1 2.1208 0.041
SHELLAGH 0 1.618 *
MK 48 AD * 0.91 
-0.026
MLRS 0 1.1732 -0.037
MK 50 0 0.86 0.028
STINGER P 1 * 0.002
HK 48 0 2.3382 0.01
STINGER B/A 0 1.0182 0.021
COPPERHEAD 0 5.4211 0.021
DIVAD 0 6.3 0.002
FIVE INCH 0 * 0.002
STINGER R 1. * -0.08
DRAGON 0 4.1852 0.014
PERSHING 2 1 2.0563 0.001
PATRIOT 0 2.2727 -0.026
STD MISSLE 2 1 1.2279 -0.026
LANCE 0 0.93 0.014
PEACEKEEPER 0 1.8095 0.03
GLCM 1 1.625 0.03
TOMAHAWK 1 0.3957 0.002
SRAM II 0 1.84 
-0.043
MINUTEMAN2 1 1 -0.02
TRIDENT 2 1 1.1391 0.028
ICBM 0 * 0.032
ALCM 0 3.3137 0.002
SRAM 0 0.5841 0.014
MINUTEMAN3 1 1 0.014
CONDOR 0 5 0.014
MAVERICK A 0 * 0.01
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